INTRODUCTION
What role should the state play in the fight against domestic violence? Although most activists in the early domestic abuse movement viewed government institutions with a robust dose of suspicion, over time they began to look to the state for substantial assistance. During this period-the late sixties and seventies-increased hope for a positive governmental role appeared to be well-founded. The civil rights, feminist, and labor movements had pushed the federal government into expanding civil liberty guarantees and economic protections. Laws were enacted prohibiting sex-and race-based discrimination, health care got a strong boost through the creation of Medicaid and Medicare, and workplace safety guarantees were expanded. And in the seventies and eighties, on the domestic violence front, state legislatures enacted civil protection order statutes that were the first laws specifically designed to protect victims of intimate abuse.
As legislatures moved ahead in establishing civil rights for women-and battered women in particular-activists focused on the corresponding need for a strong legislative and executive response from the criminal justice system. They called upon the state to mandate improved police response to domestic violence calls, to form special prosecutorial units dedicated to pursuing these cases, and to "treat domestic violence like any other crime." Government actors have responded and are now beginning to improve their records in imposing criminal sanctions in family abuse cases.
But as the state escalates its response to domestic violence, activists need to reassess their dependence on and trust in state power. Criminal prosecutions of batterers are occurring despite victim opposition and without regard to victims' wishes about the future of their families. Survivors who decline to testify voluntarily are being compelled to do so by subpoena, even when their testimony could result in a retaliatory assault. And battered women who have relied on a government safety net for survival are now being pushed off the welfare rolls, pressured to find jobs that often do not exist, and threatened with sanctions for failing to comply with these requirements.
This essay seeks to renew the energy of the domestic violence movement by taking stock of the significant victories that have been achieved in improving the state's response to family abuse over the past thirty years. It then encourages activists concerned about victims' rights to identify strategies to reduce the movement's profound dependence on state action and meet the critical challenges ahead. We can begin by working within the private sector to increase social support for victims and to strengthen their residential and economic communities. Such changes could reduce family violence and lessen the need for state intervention. But even if such efforts are successful, there will always be a need for government action in some cases. Activists, therefore, must find ways to strengthen the victim's role in the context of an exercise of state power. They must ensure that the government obtains the information necessary to permit and encourage a response that honors a survivor's personal view of the best course for herself and her family. In addition, activists need to focus on the largely neglected third branch of the state-the judiciary. While legislatures and executives have responded strongly to the problem of intimate abuse, most judges lack formal education in the field and find it difficult to sympathize with victims who frequently return to their abusive partners. Judicial failure to understand the dynamics of intimate violence often results in hostile treatment of litigants and a refusal to award the full range of protections to which victims are entitled. If movement activists can find ways to train judges and improve the justice system's response to the special problems created by family abuse cases, victims will be far better served by the laws that exist on the books.
I. RECENT VICTORIES IN REDEFINING THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE
The United States' battered women's movement grew out of the broader feminist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 2 During that period, activists perceived violence against women as integrally linked to gender inequality and viewed the political and legal establishment with suspicion, maintaining that it perpetuated institutional forms of sexism. 3 This perception led the movement to focus initially outside of the governmental sphere, on the establishment of shelters, empowerment groups, and community education workshops. 4 This distrust of the state was a natural consequence of a long history of the American legal system's approval of and complicity in violence against women. From the early colonial period onward, American courts followed British common law by affirming the husband's right of domestic chastisement. In the It was not until the late nineteenth century that states finally began to move away from actually condoning a husband's use of physical force to discipline his wife.
6 But many still clung to the position that in the absence of "serious" violence, the government should not interfere in the private, family realm. As late as 1873, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: "if no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive.", 7 This view prevailed in most states well into the twentieth century.
Given this history, it comes as no surprise that the domestic violence movement began by refusing to work cooperatively with the state. But gradually, as the enormity of the problem of intimate abuse became clear, feminist activists realized that government resources could be an essential component of an (1864) (permitting husband "to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself; and unless some permanent injury be inflicted ... to gratify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain"); cf. Robbins v. State, 20 Ala. 36, 39 (1852) (observing that wife's provocation can mitigate husband's fine for assault: "if the husband was at the time ... provoked to this unmanly act by the bad behavior and misconduct of his wife, he should not be visited with the same punishment as if he had without provocation wantonly and brutally injured one whom it was his duty to nourish and protect"). The first law against wife-beating during this period was enacted in Tennessee in 1850, although it is not known whether this statute was enforced. See Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence, sickly sensibility which holds that a man may not lay hands on his wife, even rudely, if necessary, to prevent the commission of some unlawful or criminal purpose;" a man may... be "betrayed"... "into the commission of an act, or a harsh expression, for which, in a moment after, he might be repentant and sorrowful"). effective solution. Movement strategy shifted to a push for increased legislative and executive involvement, at first through civil protection order legislation and later through mandatory arrest laws and no-drop prosecution policies.
Despite numerous frustrations and failures over the past thirty years, the domestic violence movement has made enormous strides. The country has moved from a time when no term for intimate abuse existed in the national lexicon to an era of substantial public awareness and political will to intervene. 8 Every jurisdiction has now enacted civil protection order legislation, and the vast majority of these statutes authorize the essential relief necessary for battered women to leave abusive relationships. 9 These "basics" include provisions for emergency ex parte relief,' 0 so that victims have court-ordered protection during the potentially volatile period between the time of filing a lawsuit and trial. This is the period when the abusive partner is served with court papers demonstrating the victim's intent to leave him, which often triggers a particularly severe "separation assault."
Modern laws governing civil protection orders also authorize fairly comprehensive post-trial relief. In addition to the basic provisions requiring the abuser to cease his assaults and stay away from the victim, these orders may award temporary child custody, safe visitation arrangements for the non-custodial parent, and child support.1 2 Rapid resolution of these latter issues is critical, because one of the primary reasons that victims return to their abusive partners is the pressure created by the loss of economic support. 13 potential for renewed violence is greatest during visitation, carefully structured pick-up and drop-off provisions, designed to eliminate victim-perpetrator contact, also can have a significant prophylactic effect. 14 Finally, thirty-four states have adopted criminal contempt laws to help enforce protection orders, 15 and forty-five jurisdictions have made violating a protection order a statutory crime. 16 Effective enforcement is essential to ensure meaningful compliance; otherwise, a civil protection order becomes no more than a piece of paper that a batterer can, and often will, ignore with impunity. As one study of the civil protection order process concluded, "[e]nforcement is the Achilles' heel of the ... process, because an order without enforcement at best offers scant protection and at worst increases the victim's danger by creating a false sense of security."
17
The federal government has taken action as well. In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 18 and the "daughter of VAWA" is currently pending in Congress.' 9 Among other things, these laws condition state The experience of the District of Columbia is typical. A study conducted in 1990 showed that the police were arresting accused batterers in only five percent of all intimate abuse cases. 28 They failed to arrest in more than eighty-five percent of cases in which the victim had sustained serious injuries that were visible when the police arrived on the scene. 29 Instead, police were most likely to arrest the perpetrator in situations where he insulted an officer or damaged a vehicle.
3°A
ctivists across the country have used studies like this one to convince state legislatures to enact mandatory arrest laws. 31 These statutes terminate police discretion in domestic violence cases; if probable cause exists, the officer must arrest. 32 In Washington, D.C., soon after the local mandatory arrest law went into effect, police were arresting perpetrators in forty-one percent of domestic violence calls. 33 This jump, from five to forty-one percent, reflects a sea change The police role in a dispute situation [is] more often that of a mediator and peacemaker than enforcer of the law.... IT]he possibility that ... arrest will only aggravate the dispute or create a serious danger for the arresting officers due to possible efforts to resist arrest... is most likely when a husband or father is arrested in his home.... Normally, officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall be avoided.., but when one of the parties demands arrest, you should attempt to explain the ramifications of such action (e.g., loss of wages, bail procedures, court appearances) and encourage the parties to reason with each other. MARTIN But mandatory arrest policies alone have not been sufficient. Even when presented with more domestic violence arrests, prosecutors nationwide rarely pressed charges, and when they did, they rarely followed through with the case. In the District of Columbia, for example, the charging rate was approximately fifteen percent of arrest cases, and very few of these proceeded to plea or trial. 35 The low prosecution rates were the result of a special policy for intimate abuse cases, in which charges would be dropped at the victim's request, at any time, with no questions asked. The rationale was the belief that convictions could not be obtained without victim cooperation and testimony. Although some prosecutors recognized that batterers were pressuring victims into making the request to drop the charges, they claimed that they could not distinguish between a battered woman who was communicating her true feelings and one who had a literal or figurative gun to her head. 3 6 Thus, they adopted a uniform approach and dropped charges in every case.
This "automatic drop" policy ceded to perpetrators an enormous degree of control over the criminal justice process. All a batterer had to do was coerce his victim-through violence or threats of violence-into asking the prosecutor to drop the charges; once she did so, the risk of incarceration instantly vanished.
During the 1980s and 1990s, victim advocates lobbied aggressively to change these policies, and they have finally begun making inroads in a growing number of jurisdictions. 37 Still citing the difficulty in distinguishing between those who "really" want to drop charges and those who do not, many prosecutors have adopted "no-drop" policies, pursuant to which a case proceeds regardless of the victim's wishes, as long as sufficient evidence exists to prove criminal conduct. 38 Early data indicate that these no-drop policies yield substantial positive results, between the primary aggressor, who must be arrested, and a person who may have inflicted injury on another, but who did so in self-defense. Wash., D.C., Metro. Police Dep't Gen. Order 304.11, Intrafamily Offenses, at 10-12 (Jan. 12, 1998). No data yet exist, however, from which to determine whether the General Order has resulted in a decrease in dual arrests.
34. 36. In the District of Columbia, for example, one prosecutor spent every day for six months interviewing victims of intimate abuse who sought to drop charges. Interview with Robert Spagnoletti, Chief, U.S. Attorney's Office Domestic Violence Unit, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 3, 1997) . He found that he was unable to distinguish between those who were responding to a direct threat and those who were not. Id. When he refused to honor victims' requests to drop a case, many of them called him later to explain that they had been threatened into making the request against their will and to thank him for pursuing the prosecution. Id.
37. In a recent survey, 66% of prosecutor's offices in major urban centers reported that they had adopted such policies. including the reduction of homicides. In San Diego, for example, officials found that under the old policy levels of violence increased when abusers learned that a case would be dismissed if the victim refused to cooperate. 39 In 1985, however, the city implemented a no-drop policy and domestic homicides fell from thirty in 1985, to twenty in 1990, to seven in 1994.40 No-drop policies also appear to lower recidivism and strengthen the message that intimate abuse will not be tolerated. 4 ' After years of community pressure in the District of Columbia, the U.S. Attorney's Office finally adopted an aggressive approach to prosecution, including a no-drop policy. 42 Prosecutors assigned to the newly-created Domestic Violence Unit view intimate violence as a crime against the state and seek to vindicate the government's interests regardless of the individual victim's wishes. Perpetrators no longer are able to manipulate the system by coercing the victim into dropping the charges; control has been shifted from the perpetrator to the government.
As in San Diego, D.C.'s no drop-policy led to a radical shift in domestic violence prosecutions. In 1989, the office prosecuted approximately five misdemeanor cases out of 19,000 family abuse calls to 911 emergency services.
4 3 From 1996-1997, the first year of the new regime, the Domestic Violence Unit filed approximately 6,000 misdemeanor cases. 44 The statistics for the following year are closer to 8,000. 45 An even more telling statistic is that the Unit now presses charges in approximately sixty-seven percent of arrest cases, precisely the same rate as in stranger violence arrests. 46 Similarly, the conviction rate in domestic violence cases now closely approximates that in other misdemeanor non-jury trials in the District of Columbia, ranging between sixty-five and sixty-seven percent. 4 violence criminal prosecutions to a position of rough parity with crimes perpetrated by non-intimates, and have expanded greatly the tools available to battered women seeking to escape abuse. In addition, these forms of targeted criminal legislation carry a degree of symbolic power and moral authority for which civil rulings can offer no real equivalent. The concept of treating family abuse "like any other crime" is finally within reach.
But by embracing the state as an ally, victims find themselves seeking redress from a criminal justice system that can perpetuate the kinds of power and control dynamics that exist in the battering relationship itself. In many cases, prosecutors take complete control over the case, functioning as the sole decision-maker and ignoring the victim's voice, wishes, and ideas. If a victim changes her mind mid-way through the litigation and seeks to drop charges so that the father of her children can continue to work and provide financial support, a prosecutor may refuse to do so, on the ground that this would not serve the interests of the state in punishing violations of the social contract. 4 8 Such revictimization can thwart the survivor's efforts to regain control over her life and move past the abusive experience.
Increased intervention by the criminal justice system has been particularly problematic for many subgroups of victims, in particular immigrant populations 4 9 and racial minorities. 50 For example, recent reforms in United States immigration laws create strong disincentives for immigrant women to press criminal charges against their batterers. The new laws dictate that an immigrant convicted of a domestic violence offense, stalking, or a protection order violation becomes deportable, even if he has previously obtained lawful permanent resident status.
5 1 Many women are reluctant to expose their partners to the risk of deportation, and be ostracized from their communities for doing so, particularly if the perpetrator might be subjected to political persecution if forced to return to his home country. Deportation of a batterer also may adversely affect the victim's own petition for legal residency. 52 Similarly, women of color often choose to remain silent about abuse. 48 . A prosecutor dealing with a reluctant victim in a domestic violence case faces a difficult dilemma. Does a dismissal of an individual case based on the victim's wishes occur at the expense of the public good of punishing criminal conduct and deterring future violence? Does a failure to honor a victim's wishes result in a revictimization by subjecting her to further coercion at the hands of the state? For an excellent discussion of these issues within a feminist theory framework, see Hanna, supra note 41, at 1988-89; see also Kimberle Crenshaw, whose writing explores the "intersectionality" of experiences of racism and sexism on battered women of color, argues:
Women of color are often reluctant to call the police, a hesitancy likely due to a general unwillingness among people of color to subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police force that is frequently hostile. There is also a more generalized community ethic against public intervention, the product of a desire to create a private world free from the diverse assaults on the public lives of racially subordinated people. The home is not simply a man's castle in patriarchal sense, but may also function as a safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist society. 53 In an extensive focus group study in New York, African American participants expressed the view that reporting batterers to the police was a breach of loyalty, since such reporting could further contribute to the social stereotyping of black men as particularly violent.
5 4 In one woman's words, "the ideas behind... how Black boys are feared by White people, and how police beat Black men ... it's a bad time to be Black and it's an even worse time to talk about the problems we face in our community.
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B. POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS
How can we find a satisfactory way to enhance deterrence of intimate abuse while adequately protecting the safety and autonomy of individual victims and reducing their reliance on historically discriminatory state institutions? A promising development is the extensive common ground between two symposium speakers who ultimately reach opposite conclusions: Robert Spagnoletti, Chief of the D.C. U.S. Attorney's Office Domestic Violence Unit and a strong supporter of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, 5 6 and Professor Linda Mills, known for her empathic, victim-centered work and opposition to increased criminalization. 57 Mr. Spagnoletti explains that he adopted a no-drop prosecution policy because he found it impossible to distinguish between victims who genuinely wished to drop charges and those who were being coerced. 8 Professor Mills claims that we can, and must, learn to make such distinctions by adopting a variety of victim-centered intervention policies. These positions differ less in principle than in rhetoric and in perspective on the availability of resources.
The common ground lies, at least in part, in an increased focus on the role that private individuals and communities can play in diminishing the incidence of violence and the need for state intervention, and in ensuring that the victim plays a greater role in those cases in which government response remains necessary. A growing body of research indicates that civil society has an important role to play here.
A recent study in East Lansing, Michigan, 5 9 for example, compared two groups of battered women leaving a domestic violence shelter. One was a control group; in the other, each woman was assigned a college student volunteer who served as her advocate for six hours a week, over a ten-week period. 60 The advocates had no prior experience working in the domestic violence field, but received ten weeks of training before embarking on the project. 61 Each student worked with a woman to help her assess her personal needs and goals, and then assisted her in obtaining limited or difficult to access community resources. 6 2 These resources included housing, employment, legal assistance, transportation, child care, health care, counseling for the children, and social support. 63 Both groups of women were interviewed every six months for two years.
64
Women in the advocacy group reported less physical violence-in fact, over twice as many women in the advocacy group experienced no violence whatsoever during the two-year period. 6 5 These women also experienced less depression and a higher quality of life, and those who wished to end their abusive relationships were more effective in doing SO. 6 6 Of particular importance is the fact that women with advocates perceived themselves as significantly more effective in obtaining community resources and assistance as well as interpersonal social support. 67 Similar results were reached in a study of the role of social support from family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers in determining victim follow through in domestic violence criminal prosecutions. 68 Where "follow through" was defined as cooperating in the prosecution of a batterer (after the initial decision to press charges) by providing necessary information to prosecutors and expressing a willingness to testify, 69 survivors able to access more interpersonal support were approximately twice as likely to cooperate voluntarily with the prosecution. 7°T hese results are quite exciting. They indicate that, in many cases, an increase in victim support from family, friends, and trained personnel can be enough to empower victims to exit the cycle of violence. Advocacy services apparently reduce some victims' dependency on the criminal justice system, by helping them find the strength to escape on their own. And for those who need prosecutorial intervention, the presence of an advocate or supporter enables them to better assert themselves in obtaining the help they need. By amplifying victims' voices, advocates can help the government better respond to individual concerns, and better discern those cases in which the survivor seeks to drop charges because of a considered decision that the course of action is best for herself, her family, and the larger community to which she belongs. Certainly, domestic violence is a crime against the state and generally should be treated as such; but victim advocates could be a key to transforming one-size-fits-all prosecution policies into responses that also are tailored to the concerns of individual women.
7 '
These studies and others like them indicate that as we work to increase state accountability for violence, we must put equivalent energy into providing individual advocates and creating communities that can provide victims more social support. In so doing, we may lessen the need for state intervention and, where such intervention is necessary, amplify victims' voices to enable the state to better respond to individual concerns. . 15, 1997) . The authors looked at 350 neighborhoods of diverse racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic composition within the city of Chicago. They measured the relationship between the frequency and degree of violence in each neighborhood and the prevalence of informal social control mechanisms used by local residents to ensure public order. The study was not focused specifically on domestic abuse, but the conclusions appear to be applicable to all forms of violence, whether perpetrated by strangers or intimate partners. "Informal social control" was defined to include such actions as intervening to prevent teenage peer groups from hanging out on street corners and confronting people threatening violence in public spaces. The study shows that, after controlling for all demographic factors, higher levels of informal social control are a strong predictor of lower levels of violence. And the major factors facilitating informal social control include, predictably, the degree of residential and economic stability in the community. A similar study of cities across the country found that those which had lost manufacturing jobs most rapidly between 1963 and 1990 had far higher rates of violent crime than those which had gained such jobs most rapidly. See Barry Castro, Manufacturing Jobs, Local Ownership, and the Social Health of Cities-A Research Note, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1997/98, at 63, 64. Thus, by finding ways to bolster the economic sustainability of communities, we may be able to reduce violence and, in turn, the need for criminal prosecution.
C. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
The current debate about state accountability for intimate violence has focused primarily on the legislative and executive branches of government. Questions arise about the appropriate legislative response to domestic abuse and whether and to what extent the federal government should play a role in regulating an area traditionally left to the states. Local, regional, and national conferences are being held to discuss implementation strategies adopted by the executive branch, in the form of police department arrest protocols and prosecutorial no-drop policies. Far less attention has been paid to the possibilities offered by the third branch of government-the judiciary. A fundamental restructuring of the traditional justice system's approach to the social problem of domestic abuse is, in my view, the critical next generation of work needed to improve the state's response.
The ability of the judicial system to deal with specialized forms of violence matters at least as much as the applicable substantive law. Improvements on the legislative front are doomed if judges continue to view these issues as private matters that do not belong in a courtroom, or actions that are not "really" criminal in nature.
Domestic violence activists have recently begun to focus on judicial reform, and the District of Columbia has been a leader in this movement. In November 1996, the District inaugurated a new, integrated Domestic Violence Court, in which a small number of trained judges are assigned to spend a year hearing civil protection order cases, prosecutions of crimes between intimates, and family law matters between parties where an active protective order is in place. Many interesting issues have grown out of this reform experiment, but one of the most important is the effort to combat a general failure of judicial neutrality in domestic violence cases.
Most judges come to the bench with no real understanding of the social and psychological dynamics of domestic violence and, instead, bring with them a lifetime of exposure to the myths that long have shaped the public's attitude toward the problem. The most persistent of these myths is the belief that intimate abuse is somehow acceptable, or at least insignificant, and therefore not deserving of a serious public response, and the belief that battered women could leave their relationships with relative ease if they simply chose to do so. Lack of information about these basic aspects of domestic violence causes many judges to become frustrated with petitioners whom they perceive as filing inappropriate cases and "refusing" to leave abusive relationships. State gender bias task forces across the country consistently report that the result is a persistent anti-victim bias among judges hearing family violence cases. 73 When Peacock pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, the Maryland judge who presided over his case commented, "the most difficult thing that a judge is called upon to do ... is sentencing noncriminals as criminals.", 74 He imposed an eighteen-month sentence, to be served on a work release program, which allowed Peacock to reenter the community within two weeks of sentencing. 75 In another case, a Florida judge heard testimony that a man had doused his wife with lighter fluid and set her on fire. The judge burst into song in open court crooning, "You light up my wife," to the tune of "You Light Up My Life.", 76 And a New York judge began a hearing with the comment, "Well, well, well, we had a little domestic squabble, did we? Naughty, naughty. Let's kiss and make up, and get out of my court." ' 7 7 These are just a few, particularly egregious examples culled from numerous gender bias task force reports. They may be somewhat atypical in terms of the extent of the insensitivity exhibited, but they demonstrate how deeply ingrained the problem is.
The District has attempted to respond to this problem by requiring judges on the new Domestic Violence Court to undergo formal judicial training on intimate abuse. These judges must also accept a year-long assignment, which allows them to build a reservoir of experience in the area. Although the training opportunities have been sorely limited, the advocacy community already has witnessed substantial positive changes in judicial treatment of these cases. A telling example lies in the change in judicial response to requests for custody and child support in civil protection order cases. As discussed in Part I, rapid resolution of these issues is of extreme importance in domestic violence cases, where perpetra- Sentencing in domestic violence and sexual assault cases often includes highly misguided requirements that defendants work in battered women's shelters or rape crisis centers, which are the least appropriate placements for these type[s] of offenders. Victim empathy does not come from proximity to victims but from long, intensive, painful treatment in specialized batterers' and sex offenders' programs. Prior to the Domestic Violence Court's formation, D.C. judges awarded temporary custody in fewer than half of the civil protection order cases in which the parties had a child together, despite clear statutory authorization to grant such relief. 7 8 Further, they awarded child support in only 2.6 % of civil protection order cases where the parties had a child together, and 4.9 % of those cases involving a custody order, 79 although such an award is authorized by statute and case law. 8 0 This kind of track record is typical nationwide; forty-three percent of domestic violence service providers report that judges are unwilling to consider awarding remedies that are clearly authorized by statute, especially custody, child support, and other forms of financial relief. 8 '
Id. (citations omitted
In the new Domestic Violence Court, however, judges now routinely award custody based on the best interest of the child standard as well as child support based on D.C.'s financial guidelines. Judges even occasionally take the time to talk to people who appear before them about the harmful impact that witnessing adult-on-adult abuse can have on children and about the intergenerational nature of domestic violence.
In my view, this counts as a substantial success, far beyond what I believed possible. I am beginning to conclude that targeted judicial education can be an extraordinarily effective means of accomplishing social change. The judiciary is a relatively small population to work with in the effort to debunk larger societal mythologies and stereotypes, and every judge who gains a broader understanding of the issue can have an impact on a large number of families who appear before her. Therefore, judicial training and court reform is a crucial next step if we seek to deliver on the promise of the new generation of domestic violence legislation.
CONCLUSION
The domestic violence movement has been one of the most successful sociopolitical movements of this century. The past thirty years have witnessed not only enormous improvements in societal consciousness-raising, but also a dramatically improved state response, through the availability of legal remedies and the responsiveness of the criminal justice system. But new challenges accompany this increase in the focus of state power. As the police grow more likely to arrest and prosecutors grow more likely to press charges, we must find new and innovative ways to ensure that victims' voices are not silenced and that survivors are not forced to sacrifice their autonomy in exchange for government assistance. In addition, renewed energy must be focused on helping judges purge
